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Abstract: Routing based on greedy network embeddings enables efficient and privacy-
preserving routing in overlays where connectivity is restricted to mutually trusted
nodes. In previous works, we proposed security enhancements to the embedding and
routing procedures to protect against denial-of-service attacks by malicious overlay
participants. In this work, we propose an improved timeout scheme to reduce the
stabilization overhead of secure tree maintenance in response to node failures and
malicious behavior. Furthermore, we present an attack-resistant packet replication
scheme that leverages alternative paths discovered during routing.
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1 Introduction
Friend-to-Friend (F2F) overlay networks, such as Freenet and GNUnet, provide a substrate for
privacy-preserving and censorship-resistant communication services. To reduce the exposure of
identifying information, such as the IP address, of participating nodes as well as to limit the
effectiveness of Sybil attacks, F2F overlays restrict connectivity to mutually trusted nodes.
To enable communication beyond directly connected nodes, F2F overlays require a rout-
ing algorithm for restricted topologies that is 1) highly efficient, 2) privacy-preserving, 3) ro-
bust against network dynamics, and 4) resistant to attacks. The solution proposed by Roos et
al. [RBS16] achieves (1) to (3), making it the most promising candidate. Their approach lever-
ages greedy network embeddings, which assign a unique logical coordinate to every node based
on a rooted spanning tree of the network.
State-of-the-art embedding algorithms [RBS16, H+15, HWT11] however provide limited pro-
tection against denial of service attacks by malicious nodes. Consequently, a malicious node
with just two links to the honest part of the overlay can reduce routing success ratio by up to
40% [BSR20b]. To protect against malicious node behavior, we thus proposed attack-resistant
algorithms for root election [BSR20a], breadth-first-search (BFS) tree setup [BRS19], and coor-
dinate assignment [BSR20b].
In this work, we present an improvement to our secure tree construction that reduces stabi-
lization overhead in response to non-root node failures. Furthermore, we propose an adaptive
packet replication mechanism to further increase the chance of succesful routing in the presence
of malicious nodes.
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Figure 1: Primary steps of state of the art embedding algorithms: (a) root election, (b) tree
construction, (c) coordinate assignment.
2 System Model and Adversary Model
We model a F2F overlay as a network of nodes with bidirectional, logical communication links.
The network is dynamic, such that nodes may join or leave the network and links are set up and
torn down over time.
To enable routing, the overlay utilizes a distributed embedding algorithm, which assigns a
unique logical coordinate to each overlay node. In our work, we focus on embeddings that use
vectors of integers as coordinates, as these enable efficient addressing without the need to obtain
global topology information, such as the number of participating nodes.
Current embedding algorithms assign coordinates by first constructing a distributed BFS span-
ning tree of the overlay network. Afterwards, the root node chooses the empty vector as its log-
ical coordinate. Each node subsequently obtains a logical coordinate by appending a random
integer to the coordinate of its parent in the spanning tree, as illustrated in Figure 1.
To route a message to a given destination coordinate d, nodes use a distance metric to measure
the logical distance of each neighbor’s coordinate to d. The message is then forwarded greedily
to one of those neighbors whose coordinate has the lowest logical distance to d.
In our work, we consider an internal adversary that controls a subset of the nodes participating
in the overlay, which we call malicious nodes. For readability, we call a non-malicious node an
honest node in the following.
Each malicious node may collude with other malicious nodes and deviate arbitrarily from the
correct behavior, e.g. by sending messages with incorrect data and dropping messages. Due to
the absence of a central admission control, the adversary may furthermore introduce an arbitrary
number of additional malicious nodes that are not connected to any honest node.
While the adversary can arbitrarily set up links between malicious nodes, we assume that the
total number of links between malicious and honest nodes is bounded. We consider this assump-
tion to be realistic, since the setup of connections to honest nodes requires social engineering,
which we consider to be too costly to conduct on a large number of individuals.
With regards to computational resources, we assume that the adversary is limited to polyno-
mial time and hence unable to break computationally secure cryptographic primitives. However,
the total computational power of the adversary may still be much higher than the computational
power of the honest nodes combined.
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3 Timeout thresholds for efficient and secure tree maintenance
To securely detect the failure of a root node, we proposed the periodic propagation of timestamps
along with cryptographic signatures generated by the root node [BSR20a]. If the root node
fails or becomes unreachable due to overlay partitioning, the existing timestamps will eventually
expire and nodes will start to elect a new root node. However, if a non-root node u fails, its
children may not be able to tell whether the root node is still reachable via another path.
To reduce stabilization overhead if the root node is still reachable, it is desirable to ensure
that nodes in the subtree formerly rooted at u will first try to locate an alternative path be-
fore electing a new root. However, state-of-the-art algorithms for secure BFS tree mainte-
nance [DMT15, BRS19] may temporarily create cycles, which require the affected nodes to
change their state multiple times before a stable state is reached. To avoid the formation of cy-
cles and thus reduce convergence time, we extend our algorithm by distinguishing between two
thresholds Tsearch ∈ N and Treset ∈ N with Tsearch < Treset . When the difference between u’s sys-
tem time and the most recent timestamp reported by its current parent exceeds Tsearch, u checks
if there are neighbors whose reported timestamp does not exceed threshold Ttree. If this is the
case, then u will select one of those neighbors as its new parent. Otherwise, u will not change its
parent. If all timestamps reported by u’s neighbors exceed threshold Treset , then u will consider
its current root node failed.
Let fheartbeat be the frequency at which the root node generates new timestamps and let du be
the hop distance from u to the root node. Given upper bounds on the maximum clock difference
∆C between any two nodes, the maximum processing and transmission delay ∆P between any two
nodes, the number of lost timestamp messages nlost , we set Tsearch = ∆C +∆Pdu +nlost · fheatbeat .
Given an upper bound D on the network diameter, we set Treset = Tsearch +∆PD. We consider
knowledge of an upper bound on the diameter to be realistic, as studies on social graphs indicate
that even networks with millions of users have a diameter below 35 [Les].
In the case the root node actually became unreachable, the comparatively high value for Treset
causes the overlay to operate without a valid root node for a longer time. However, the study
by Roos et al. [RBS16] shows that if multiple embeddings are constructed, routing is still highly
likely to succeed despite a temporary root failure. Thus, it is possible to tolerate a delayed
reaction to root node failures in favor of reduced overhead for adaptation to non-root faults.
4 Adaptive packet replication for robust and secure routing
When a node u routes a message m towards a particular coordinate C, it is possible that multiple
neighbors of u have a lower distance to C. To enable discovery of alternative paths in the presence
of faults, Roos et al. [RBS16] propose backtracking: if the neighbor v chosen by u as next hop
is unable to forward m further towards C, it will notify u accordingly and u will send m to a
different neighbor with a lower distance. If u is not the originator of m and received negative
feedback from all closer neighbors, it will notify its predecessor about its failure to forward m.
While backtracking increases robustness against node failures, it relies on nodes to correctly
report failures to route. Thus, if a malicious node silently drops a message received from an
honest node u, then u will not detect the loss and initiate backtracking. As an alternative, we
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propose an adaptive replication of packets. To do so, we let the originator include a replication
counter r in each message. If a node u needs to forward a message with r = k and has at least k
closer neighbors, it will send a copy of m with r = 1 to the k closest neighbors. If u has less than
k closer neighbors, it may send a copy of m to each closer neighbor such that the sum of the r
values yields k. The initial value of r can be changed to trade off overhead and attack-resistance.
Compared to having the originator sending the same message multiple times, this approach
avoids duplicate transmissions of the same message over the same link.
5 Conclusion and future work
In this work, we proposed a timeout scheme that enables nodes to check for alternative paths
to the root node before starting a new election. Furthermore, we presented a proactive message
replication scheme to improve resilience against packet dropping by malicious nodes.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed measures, we will conduct a simulation study
using different real world social graphs. For the timeout thresholds proposed in this paper, we
expect a significant reduction in stabilization overhead over a naive root timeout in response to
failure of nodes with degree, as these are likely to have a large number of children. For the
adaptive packet replication, we expect the increase in routing success ratio over routing with
backtracking in the presence of malicious nodes to grow with the network density, as more
alternative paths become available.
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